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Abstract: The increasing complexity of construction projects imposes the need to address various aspects of project management in more detail. The success of a 
construction project depends on many variables and the process of supplier selection is certainly one of them. In recent years, the importance of electronic reverse 
auctions use in public sector construction procurement has been increasing, since they can bring substantial price savings. However, auctions are also criticized since they 
may result in the submission of abnormally low bids. This paper therefore aims to explore the impact of electronic reverse auctions on the competitive environment in 
public works contracts and on the occurrence of abnormally low bids. The results of quantitative research on Czech construction tenders revealed that the use of auctions 
decreases the number of bidders while increasing the probability of occurrence of abnormally low bids. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
  
The use of electronic reverse auctions (e-RA) within 
the construction sector is seen as controversial due to 
ethical reasons, unsuitability of some products for 
auction, potential inadequate quality of delivery and 
submission of abnormally low bids by suppliers as well as 
other reasons. Inexperienced purchasing personnel and 
incorrect management decisions regarding the use of 
e-RA may cause significant losses and problems during 
the performance of public works contracts as well as 
afterwards when buildings and facilities are in operation. 
As the aspect of life cycle costs [1] gains in importance, 
due to increased energy consumption of buildings and 
other factors, more attention should be paid to the quality 
of the construction works delivered. As quality is related 
to bid prices [2], it is crucial to detect potential 
abnormally low bids (ALB) to prevent future delivery 
problems. This paper explores the effect of e-RA on the 
competition in public works tenders in relation to the 




Over past decades, e-RA have become a useful 
electronic tool to select suppliers and award tenders in 
various industries for different products, services and 
works. They can be defined as online real-time bidding 
events between a purchasing institution (the buyer) and a 
group of pre-qualified suppliers competing among 
themselves in order to win the tender [3]. Buyers are 
motivated to use e-RA since they are associated with 
price savings [4], cycle time reduction [5], transparency 
of the tender procedure [6], elimination of geographical 
barriers [7], and enhanced efficiency of the purchasing 
process [4]. On the other hand, buyers must take into 
account that e-RA may also harm buyer-supplier 
relationships [3], require the purchase of hardware and 
software, cause a decrease in the quality of the delivery 
[5], and can be accompanied by low participation of 
bidders in the tender as some suppliers are not willing to 
participate in e-RA [6]. In this context, the findings of [8] 
show that the willingness to participate in e-bidding is 
strongly influenced by perceived barriers and benefits, 
costs, and security concerns. 
The potential use of e-RA should be subject to a 
proper decision-making process, as auctions are not 
suitable for all purchase situations. Hawkins et al. [9] 
introduce an e-RA appropriateness model which can serve 
as a supporting tool for making an informed decision on 
e-RA adoption and use. The papers [10] or [11] can also 
be used in a similar way. In general, the following basic 
conditions should be met to handle e-RA appropriately: 1) 
the subject of the purchase can be clearly specified; 2) the 
quantity demanded is sufficiently attractive; 3) there is a 
sufficient supply base on the market; 4) suppliers are 
willing and prepared to participate in e-RA; and 5) the 
assumptions regarding potential price decrement in e-RA 
are reasonable (developed from [3] and [12]).  
Although the use of e-RA is associated with various 
influencing variables, price savings are the main 
motivating factor for their use. As suppliers see other bids 
– or at least the best bid – offered in the tender, they have 
equal conditions and the opportunity to decrease their bids 
in order to win the contract. As the amount of price 
savings is associated with the number of bids in the tender 
[13], it is crucial to motivate the greatest possible number 
of potential suppliers to participate. In this context, 
authors in [14] argue that four bidders participating in 
e-RA already create a sufficient level of competition in 
the tender, supporting the conditions for a reasonable 
price decrement, which is promoted by new public 
management [15]. 
However, there is one important ethical question 
related to the use of auctions to decrease the purchase 
price: it is likely that as a consequence, suppliers will 
submit ALB more often in order to win the tender. ALB 
occur either inadvertently, as the consequence of incorrect 
cost estimates, or intentionally, as an attempt to stay in 
business [16]. Awarding the contract to suppliers who 
submitted ALB is risky, as the buyer may face cost and 
time overruns, a lower-quality delivery, or the inability of 
the supplier to complete the work during the delivery 
phase of the project. 
It needs to be mentioned that the occurrence of ALB 
may also be supported by an incorrect cost estimate on the 
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part of the buyer, who has to publish the "expected value" 
of the contract (EV). Authors in [17] report that the 
estimation of costs of large construction projects, such as 
transportation tunnels, is highly complex and challenging 
for public authorities during the feasibility stage. 
However, cost estimates are also more frequently 
inaccurate when they are made in later stages of a project 
and when they concern construction projects that are 
unique. Estimates of contract value are required by legal 
regulations [18] and, if applicable, can also be supported 
by relevant software tools based on project management 
approach enabling cost estimation [19]. 
ALB are nevertheless difficult to analyse, since their 
definition is not uniform. In some countries, ALB are 
defined as a deviation from the client’s cost estimate or as 
a deviation from the average bid [20]. As they are 
difficult to detect, there have been suggestions to use 
statistical methods to determine bid "abnormality" [21] 
and a rank-and-compare algorithm was proposed by [22]. 
The key is how to set the right ALB width: if it is too 
narrow, it will cause rejection of bids that are actually 
competitive and valid [21]. 
In the Czech Republic, it is very challenging to detect 
ALB, since the applicable legislation does not define 
"abnormality" of bids in a mathematical way. The Act no. 
137/2006 Coll. on Public Procurement [23], requires 
assessment of bid prices with regard to the subject of the 
contract by an evaluation committee. If any ALB are 
detected in this way, the evaluation committee must 
request a written explanation from the supplier; however, 
the law does not provide any objective guidelines for the 
detection. 
Since e-RA have a significant effect on tender 
outcomes [24], the use of auctions within the construction 
sector deserves a more detailed examination focused on 
the competition in the tender and the occurrence of ALB. 
Important issues arising out of the conducted literature 
review are highlighted in the next chapter in the context 
of development of hypotheses. 
As the current body of knowledge devoted to e-RA in 
the construction sector is limited, see studies [25] and [8] 
dealing with the perception of e-RA in project 
procurement from the point of view of construction 
contractors and with the willingness of construction 
organizations to participate in e-bidding, respectively, 
[21], and [26], this paper seeks to improve the 
understanding of e-RA in construction; specifically, it 
focuses on the potential of achieving sufficient 
competition in the tender and on the evaluation of 
undesirable occurrence of ALB in public works tenders. 
 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Description of Area of Study and Research Sample  
 
This paper examines public works contracts in the 
Czech Republic; in particular, it deals with a set of 
tenders that have been processed both with and without 
the use of e-RA. Data on tenders not supported by e-RA 
were collected from the Bulletin of Public Procurement 
[27], an online portal operated by the Ministry of 
Regional Development of the Czech Republic, while data 
on tenders supported by e-RA were collected from the 
database of an e-RA system provider operating in the 
Czech Republic. In total, 674 records on public tenders 
were collected (see Tab. 1). Information on the following 
variables was required for each record: subject of the 
tender, number of suppliers participating in the tender 
(NSup), estimated value of the contract (EV), and 
winning bid price (WBP). Any records that did not 
contain information on one or more of these variables 
were removed from the research sample. Furthermore, the 
research sample only included tenders with at least two 
assessed bids, since a tender with one bid or no bids 
submitted must be cancelled, according to applicable law. 
And finally, outliers in both categories (tenders with and 
without e-RA support) were removed by using boxplot. 
The resulting research sample, reduced in size to 387 
records, was then examined further. A significantly higher 
difference between the sizes of initial and reduced 
research samples within tenders supported by e-RA is 
caused by a high frequency of missing variables in 
individual records. 
 
Table 1 Basic characteristics of the research sample 
Category Initial research sample 
Reduced research 
sample 
Supported by e-RA 418 178 
Not supported by e-RA 248 209 
Total 674 387 
 
3.2 Hypotheses and Methods  
 
Chapter 2 mentions several important aspects that 
arise in the context of e-RA use. One of them is that the 
use of e-RA can result in the reduction of the number of 
suppliers participating in the tender (as many suppliers are 
not willing to participate in e-RA). Accordingly, 
hypothesis H1 was formulated as follows: 
H1: The number of bidders participating in the tender 
is dependent on the use of e-RA. 
Data are evaluated using a histogram. 
Moreover, since high pressure on price forces 
suppliers to change their bid prices, it can be expected 
that the relative frequency of bid prices that could be 
considered as abnormally low will be higher in tenders 
supported by e-RA. 
H2: The occurrence of ALB is dependent on the use 
of e-RA. 
The applicable Czech law [23] does not define ALB. 
With regard to hypothesis H2, ALB are therefore defined 
as the relative difference between EV and WBP equal to 




WBPEV                                                     (1) 
 
As the data consisted of two categorical independent 
variables, they were evaluated using a chi-square test with 
a 95% confidence interval. The evaluation only included 
values of winning bid prices in the individual tenders (the 
final bid prices of tender winners). Therefore, the 
potential occurrence of ALB in non-winning bids was not 
taken into consideration, because the research sample did 
not contain this data. 
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Participations of Bidders in the Tender  
 
In relation to hypothesis H1, it was analysed whether 
the use of e-RA has an impact on the number of bidders in 
the tender. The data are shown in Fig. 1, where "e-RA S" 
represents tenders supported by e-RA and "e-RA NS" 
represents tenders that were not supported by e-RA. 
 
 
Figure 1 Participation of suppliers in tenders with and without e-RA support  
 
The data clearly show that tenders supported by e-RA 
have lower numbers of bidders in comparison to tenders 
not supported by e-RA. In the category of tenders 
supported by e-RA, 65.7% of the tenders had two to four 
bidders, while in case of tenders without e-RA support it 
was only 32.5%. Moreover, the highest number of bidders 
was 12 for e-RA S and 16 for e-RA NS. Nevertheless, 
competition in the tender should also be evaluated based 
on whether the number of bidders is sufficient, as authors 
in [14] argue that the participation of four bidders already 
creates favourable conditions for a reasonable price 
decrement. According to this measure, 44.9% of tenders 
supported by e-RA are classified as tenders with low 
competitive environment (three bidders or less). Based on 
these results, it can be argued that tenders supported by 
e-RA have considerably lower numbers of bidders than 
traditional tenders. Accordingly, hypothesis H1 is 
confirmed. 
It should be noted that the number of bidders may 
depend on the specific market segment. The construction 
market is characterized by high product diversity, since 
public authorities demand delivery of works as dissimilar 
as transport infrastructure (roads, railways), buildings and 
facilities (offices, schools, hospitals) and engineering 
networks (water supply systems, sewerage). As the supply 
conditions on these individuals markets might be 
considerably different, future research should explore this 
aspect in more detail to determine which structures are 
not suitable for auctions with regard to achieving 
sufficient competition in the tenders. Such analysis may 
help to use e-RA in a more appropriate way, since they 
can be more successful when there is a higher level of 
competition on the supply market [28]. Therefore, 
estimates of the number of potential bidders competing in 





4.2 Analysis of ALB Occurrence  
 
In order to evaluate the effect of e-RA use on the 
frequency of ALB occurrence in public works tenders, the 
data have been divided into relevant categories. The 
values of absolute frequency of tenders for public works 
contracts with and without ALB are presented in Tab. 2. 
 
Table 2 Absolute frequency of tenders for public works contracts with and 
without ALB  
Category No ALB ALB Total 
Supported by e-RA 145 33 178 
Not supported by e-RA 188 21 209 
Total 333 54 387 
 
The p-value for the chi-square statistics of 5.773 with 
1 degree of freedom is 0.016. Since the p-value is < 0.05, 
the null hypothesis on the independence of examined 
categorical variables is accepted; in other words, the 
frequency of ALB occurrence is not dependent on the use 
of e-RA. Accordingly, hypothesis H2 is rejected.  
 
 
Figure 2 Representation of ALB within e-RA S with respect to the number of 
bidders 
 
As the level of competition can be expressed by the 
number of bidders, it has also been evaluated whether the 
occurrence of ALB increases with increasing number of 
bidders for tenders supported by e-RA. Data indicating 
the relative representation of ALB in the research sample 
with respect to the number of bidders are shown in Figs. 2 
and 3. Only tenders with up to eight bidders are included 
in the data, as the number of records within e-RA S above 
eight bidders is very small (only five tenders). 
Fig. 2 suggests that there is a certain tendency to a 
higher probability of ALB occurrence with the increasing 
number of bidders. It is important to note that achieving 
lower prices in auctions may be at the expense of the 
quality of work delivered. A large disparity between 
expected value and winning bid price could mean that the 
contractor is making a loss, which he might want to 
compensate by using low quality materials or poor 
workmanship [25]. Scientific literature suggests an e-RA 
model with quality preference [30]; however, this model 
is mostly suitable for goods in multi-attribute auctions, 
not for the delivery of works. It is therefore crucial that 
the public authority specifies the subject of purchase 
clearly and in detail, ensures thorough inspection on the 
site during the whole period of execution of works, and 
also carefully checks whether the bids are abnormally low 
during the tender procedure to reduce the risk of future 
delivery problems. 
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Figure 3 Representation of ALB within e-RA NS with respect to the number of 
bidders 
 
Compared to the distribution of ALB within the e-RA 
S category, the occurrence of ALB within tenders not 
supported by e-RA with NSup ≤ 8 is considerably smaller 
(Fig. 3). Bearing in mind that the occurrence of ALB is 
not dependent on the use of e-RA (see hypothesis H2), it 
is obvious that a larger proportion of ALB occurrence 
within e-RA NS appears if NSup > 8. This result clearly 
shows that competition in auctions helps to decrease the 
purchase price even with a smaller number of suppliers 
participating in e-RA S than in traditional procurement. It 
can therefore be concluded that with increasing number of 
participating suppliers, auctions contribute to price 
decrement, but on the other hand, the probability of ALB 
occurrence also increases. 
Regarding the price decrement, buyers should 
monitor the development of project costs during its 
implementation thoroughly in order to avoid unfounded 
price increment. According to [31], cost control is ranked 
as the 5th most important success aspect of construction 
project. 
 
5 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Proper management of the public tender procedure is 
a key prerequisite for the success of the project. The 
complexity of construction projects increases the demand 
for efficient project management and makes public tender 
management even more difficult, as the buyers must pay 
attention not only to the performance of the works, but 
also to the preparation phase of the project and selection 
of suppliers. 
This paper addresses one specific aspect of public 
sector construction procurement, namely the effect of 
electronic reverse auctions on competition and on the 
occurrence of abnormally low bids. This issue is 
important since awarding contracts to ineligible suppliers 
may cause significant problems during project delivery in 
terms of low quality of works and materials, time and cost 
overruns, or even the supplier’s inability to perform the 
contract. 
First, it was proven that electronic reverse auctions 
may cause a decrease in the number of suppliers 
participating in a given tender. On the other hand, when 
looking on the frequency of ALB occurrence in public 
works tenders, it seems that even with a lower number of 
bidders, it is possible to achieve higher price savings if 
e-RA are applied. Therefore, buyers should carefully 
estimate – with respect to the actual supply conditions on 
individual segments of the construction market – the 
potential number of suppliers participating in the tender to 
ensure a sufficiently competitive environment in the 
virtual auction hall. 
Second, the research results showed that a higher 
level of competition in e-RA tenders contributes to the 
willingness of suppliers to submit ALB, usually 
motivated by fear of losing the contract. Hence, public 
authorities using e-RA should carefully check whether 
winning bids are abnormally low. 
This research has two main limitations. First, the 
limited research sample did not make it possible to 
examine the potential effect of the type of work procured. 
It can be expected that there are different supply 
conditions on specific construction markets. Second, only 
the winning bid prices were examined, as the analysis did 
not contain data on bid prices submitted by all suppliers 
participating in the tenders. It would be interesting to 
examine how many bidders actually submit ALB in 
individual tenders. 
Future research could focus on the creation of a more 
complex model taking into consideration additional 
aspects, such as the type of work, the volume of the 
contract or the attractiveness of individual buyers. The 
assessment of potential of financial savings that can be 
achieved through auctions also represents an interesting 
area of study. As price decrement is viewed as a crucial 
e-RA benefit, evaluation of the financial effect of e-RA 
use could potentially contribute to more informed 
decisions about the acceptance or rejection of electronic 
reverse auctions within construction project management 
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